Rational Choice in Experimental Markets by Plott, Charles R.
Rational Choice in Experimental Markets
Author(s): Charles R. Plott
Source: The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory (Oct., 1986), pp. S301-S327
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352762 .
Accessed: 24/03/2014 18:50
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Business.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Mar 2014 18:50:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology 
Rational Choice in 
Experimental Markets* 
The theory of rational individual choice has 
many different uses in experimental economics. 
The uses must be considered in any realistic 
evaluation of the theory. This paper is organized 
around that perspective. 
If the only question posed is, Rational choice, 
true or false? then the answer is clearly false. 
Many critics of economics have claimed that the 
discipline is built on untestable foundations. 
Economists are indebted to psychologists for de- 
bunking such critics and demonstrating that the 
theory can indeed be tested. However, the 
gratitude can go only so far. During the 
process of demonstrating testability, the psy- 
chologists disconfirmed the theory. Preference 
transitivity experiments (Tversky 1969) and 
preference reversal experiments (Grether and 
Plott 1979) both demonstrate that the weakest 
forms of the classical preference hypothesis' are 
systematically at odds with facts. 
The theory of rational 
behavior has several 
different uses. First, it 
is used at the most 
fundamental evel 
of experimental meth- 
odology to induce 
preferences used as pa- 
rameters in models. 
Second, it appears re- 
peatedly in experimen- 
tally successful mathe- 
matical models of 
complex phenomena 
such as speculation, 
bidding, and signaling. 
Third, it is used as a 
tool to generate ex post 
models of results that 
are otherwise inexplic- 
able. Finally, it has 
been used as a tool 
successfully to design 
new institutions to 
solve specific prob- 
lems. When tested di- 
rectly, the theory can 
be rejected. It is re- 
tained because neither 
an alternative theory 
nor an alternative gen- 
eral principle accom- 
plishes so much. 
* Financial support from the National Science Foundation 
and from the Caltech Program of Enterprise and Public Policy 
is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank Kemal Guler for 
his help in processing the data used in Sec. III. I also wish to 
thank Barry Weingast and Harvey Reed for their collabora- 
tion on the ideas and background data processing that form 
that section. 
1. The classical hypothesis is taken to be that attitudes of 
preference can be represented by total, reflexive, negatively 
acyclic binary relations. For generalizations and alternatives 
to this hypothesis, see Aizerman (1985). 
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It follows that theories of markets for which rational individual 
choice is a necessary component are either discomfirmed by the same 
evidence or cannot be applied because the preconditions for applica- 
tion are not present. The logic is compelling, and an awareness of its 
existence has colored how experimental economists pose questions, 
how they do experiments, and what they conclude. If one wants only 
to "test" a theory in the sense of rejection, then one should examine its 
most suspect predictions. If, as part of its formulation of market behav- 
ior, a theory predicts acyclic individual choice behavior-as is the case 
with almost all economics models-then one seeking a disconfirmation 
of the theory knows exactly where to look and how to proceed. Exist- 
ing experiments on individual choice behavior provide ample ma- 
chinery. 
The rejection of a theory of markets on the terms described above is 
not an especially challenging research objective. Those who study ex- 
perimental markets tend to pose the questions in different ways. 
Rather than inquire whether a theory is true or false, they ask if the 
magnitude of error in the predictions of market phenomena is accept- 
able; or, if no concept of degree of acceptability is readily available, the 
question becomes which of several competing models is the most accu- 
rate, fully realizing that the best model might still be "poor." When 
confronted with data that suggest the existence of erratic or irrational 
individual behavior, the implications are immediately evaluated in 
terms of the possible implications for a market level of analysis. Of 
course, when unusual market behavior is observed, one might then 
turn to models of irrational individual behavior to see if they contain 
the seeds of an explanation. 
In brief it is almost impossible to assess the importance of any prob- 
lem with rationality postulates as found in experimental market studies 
without assessing the performance of the market models based on such 
postulates. In Section I, I will discuss hypotheses about rational behav- 
ior that are built directly into the foundations of laboratory market 
procedures. In Section II, three examples of laboratory experiments 
will be discussed. The accuracy of the models and the rationality pos- 
tulates that form the structure of the rnodels will be covered. Section 
III will demonstrate how ideas of rationality can be used to explain 
otherwise very confusing market behavior. Section IV will examine 
unusual phenomena that models of rational behavior suggest might 
exist, and Section V will discuss some pending problems for concepts 
of rationality as they are currently used. 
I. Laboratory Market Procedures and Rationality 
For the most part, laboratory markets are created as a challenge to 
theory. One research objective is to construct simple markets that are 
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special cases of the complicated phenomena to which the models are 
ordinarily applied. The relative accuracies of models are assessed. The 
models are changed in light of the data from the special case. It is 
hoped, as a result, that the revised models will be more useful when 
applied to the complex. While other research strategies can be 
identified (Plott 1982, esp. pp. 1519-23), this particular strategy is fre- 
quently used. 
The above objective demands that laboratory economics procedures 
permit some reasonably direct correspondence between parameters of 
models and what is controlled in an experiment. The important vari- 
ables of almost all economic models are preferences (as opposed to 
sources of motivation), beliefs, resources, market organization (institu- 
tions), technology, commodities, prices, allocations, and incomes. If a 
model is to be evaluated, all these variables need to be observed and 
sometimes controlled. If a variable cannot be observed directly, then it 
is always suspected of having gone awry when the model itself does not 
fit the data. Of course, in this context, the preferences and beliefs are 
key because (a) they can be used to explain almost any pattern of the 
other variables (Ledyard, in press) and (b) they cannot be observed 
directly. 
Laboratory techniques control preferences or, in a sense, allow them 
to be observed indirectly. The basic insight is that preferences are 
parameters to economic models, but the source of preferences is not a 
parameter. The key idea is to use monetary incentives to induce prefer- 
ences for abstract commodities that exist only for the purpose of the 
experiment. Consider the following axioms, which are a combination 
of the precepts used by Smith (1976) and the axioms used by Plott 
(1979). If the following axioms are accepted, then preferences can be 
induced and controlled for purposes of experimentation. 
1. More reward medium (money) is preferred to less, other things 
being equal (salience and nonsatiation). 
2. Individuals place no independent value on experimental out- 
comes other than that provided by the reward medium (neutrality). 
3. Individuals optimize. 
Suppose, for example, that a commodity is the set of nonnegative 
integers, which are called units of the commodity X. Another commod- 
ity, Y, is simply U.S. currency. An individual, i, is assigned a function, 
Ri(x), indicating the reward (dollar amount) he will receive from the 
experimenter should he acquire x units of the commodity. If postulates 
1-3 are satisfied, then we can take as a parameter in a model, defined 
over X * Y where the operation * is a Cartesian product, the binary 
relation Pi, defined by (x, y)Pi(x', y') X R'(x) + y > R'(x') + y'. The 
relation Pi is the preference relation of i. If the axioms are satisfied, 
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then Pi is in fact the individual's preference relation in the same sense 
that it will reflect actual individual choices from the pairs in X * Y. 
Since the experimenter controls the functional form of R1(-), the prefer- 
ence relation of each individual can be controlled as desired. 
Carrying the example further, we could view R1(x) - R1(x - 1) as the 
willingness to pay for additional units of X. In some circumstances the 
difference would be interpreted as an (inverse) demand function. That 
is, supose p is a constant price that a subject must pay for units of X. 
An optimizing subject would want to maximize R1(x) - px. The op- 
timum occurs (ignoring the problem caused by the discrete formula- 
tion) at the point x such that R1(x) - R1(x - 1) = p. Solving the 
equation for x, we obtain a function, x = Di(p), which can be inter- 
preted as an individual demand function for X. 
Notice that, if any of the conditions, 1, 2, or 3, is not satisfied, then a 
key parameter is misspecified. When asked to choose over X * Y, the 
subject's choices would not be those predicted by Pi. If this occurs, 
and if the experimenter is not aware of the problem, a model might be 
discarded as inaccurate when in fact the experiment was not properly 
controlled. The point to be emphasized is that a theory of rationality is 
basic to experimental procedures and to the interpretation of the re- 
sults. If rationality is not reliable behaviorally, then one would expect 
economic models to be poor predictors of experimental market behav- 
ior because the basic parameters of the economic models would not be 
controllable. 
The nature of the argument just outlined suggests a first line of de- 
fense that can be used by anyone whose pet theory has been abused by 
experimental data. Were the payoffs of a sort that assures that postu- 
late 1 is satisfied? For the most part economists have used money in 
amounts that will acoumulate to amounts comparable to wage rates (for 
equivalent time) of employed members of the subject pools. Typically, 
this amount is between $8.00 and $20 per hour. A failure to provide 
adequate incentives is known to affect results at a group level of per- 
formance in ways that do not disappear with large samples.2 Results 
regarding the importance of incentives when studying individual 
choices have been mixed. For example, Grether and Plott (1979) found 
no incentive effects. The most recent study is by Grether (1981), who 
demonstrated that the instances of seemingly confused behavior go up 
when incentives go down. 
The second postulate substantially differentiates those who study 
markets from those who study individuals. Psychologists frequently 
2. Only two examples exist. Once problems were detected along this line, subsequent 
experiments used more incentives. The committee experiments studied by Fiorina and 
Plott (1978) used incentives as a control. Means and variances were affected substan- 
tially. Plott and Smith (1978) demonstrate that traders tend not to trade units for which 
positive profits will be made. Just breaking even is not enough. 
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use rich descriptions of situations to elicit responses. From an econo- 
mist's point of view, this practice is one that is to be viewed with 
suspicion.3 Data that lead to a model's rejection can always be ex- 
plained away by hypotheses that take advantage of any ambiguity that 
might exist over what preferences "really" existed in the experiment. 
The final condition, 3, depends not only on human nature but also on 
whether the subject understands the relation R1(-). This function is 
seldom simply verbally communicated to the subject. If the function 
involves random elements, they are made operational with real random 
devices (the word "probability" is not used). Subjects are given expe- 
rience with the properties of Ri(-) and tested on their understanding of 
it. Sometimes the instructions of a complicated market experiment 
involve exercises in which subjects choose over X * Y or its equivalent 
as a check on conditions 1-3. While these precautions are taken as a 
defense against disgruntled theorists who might dismiss results on the 
(self-serving) claim that the preferences were not controlled, they also 
comment on implicit assumptions about the nature of rationality: intel- 
ligence is important; verbal communication is suspect; analytical and 
cognitive abilities are not dependable over experience. So the experi- 
ment proceeds, allowing for the possibility that individuals might be 
satisficers in the Simon (1979) sense and fail to explore the nature of 
Ri(x) if left to their own devices. 
Acknowledged problems with the concept of rational choice have 
shaped experimental market procedures in still a third way that was 
mentioned in the opening paragraphs. Almost all economic models 
postulate the existence (on an "as if' basis) of a transitive preference 
over lotteries. Thus transitive choice over lotteries can be viewed as a 
prediction made by the models. We know from Tversky's (1969) work 
on transitivity and from preference reversal experiments (Grether and 
Plott 1979) that those particular predictions of the models will be 
disconfirmed; that is, we know that models of this type make predic- 
tions that are wrong. Logic thus compels us to realize that the "truth" 
of the models is not necessarily the only goal of the research effort 
because we already have the answer to that question. Instead the re- 
search question becomes the degree to which one model is better than 
another at capturing market behavior. Experiments should be designed 
to make comparisons among models whenever such comparisons are 
3. I am aware of one documented example of a problem caused by the descriptions of 
the alternatives. In Cohen, Levine, and Plott (1978) subjects were involved in a voting 
experiment. The objects of choice (letters of the alphabet) were labeled in humorous 
ways. Traditional financial incentives were also operative. The group-choice model, 
which had worked well in other experiments, was not working well, so subjects were 
asked to explain the reasons for their votes. The recorded votes and the reasons given by 
subjects indicated that subjects neglected the financial incentives and chose in ways they 
imagined reasonable in light of the humorous description of the options. 
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possible. Which model throws light on market behavior? Which model 
is true is a different question. 
II. Performance of Market Models 
If rationality assumptions are totally unreliable, then one would expect 
market models based on them to be similarly unreliable. Preferences 
for outcomes might be induced by the procedures outlined above, but it 
does not follow that the market supply and demand functions can be 
constructed from those preferences. An uncontrolled aspect of ration- 
ality is required to go from preferences to market demand; or demands 
and supplies might have been controlled, but laboratory markets are 
complicated and involve expectations formation, strategy, and so 
forth. The demand and supply model itself might not work as a predic- 
tor of price; or events in the market could override the incentives used. 
People simply might not be able to cope or might become irritated or 
frustrated so easily that no market model would work. If people are 
erratic and/or irrational, the induced preferences will not guarantee the 
accuracy of economic models. 
Three different examples of market experiments are now sum- 
marized. Each relies on different features of human capacities. All are 
"success stories" in the sense that a mathematical model based on 
principles of rational choice seems to capture much of what is ob- 
served. The replications of these experiments have occurred in enough 
similar situations that the inferences drawn from the examples proba- 
bly reliably reflect the facts as opposed to outlying or fortuitous obser- 
vations. 
A. Middlemen 
The first example comes from a paper by Plott and Uhl (1981). The 
concern was with middlemen. Each of a group of suppliers was given a 
marginal cost function by application of induced preferences theory. If 
price was constant and each followed the competitive optimizing re- 
sponse, the market supply curve would be as shown in figure 1. Simi- 
larly, final buyers each had a derived demand. Should final buyers have 
responded in an optimizing fashion to a fixed price, the market demand 
would have been as shown in the figure. Each agent was assigned a 
different number to use as a name during the experiment. The numbers 
on the market demand and supply functions refer to the agent who had 
the limit value at the indicated level. 
Final buyers and suppliers were in different rooms and could neither 
trade nor communicate. A group of four middlemen (speculators) were 
allowed first to visit the suppliers' room, at which time a market, A, 
was opened. Having acquired inventories, the middlemen were then 
taken to the final buyers' room, where they were able to sell in market 
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B what they had previously purchased in market A. After market B 
was closed, the middlemen returned to market A to start a new period 
(of two markets). Inventories could not be carried forward to succeed- 
ing periods. Everything acquired in A had to be sold in B or forgotten. 
Both markets were organized in a manner similar to oral double 
auctions. 
If the individuals serving the middleman function were optimizers 
and correctly assessed the probability of sales in market B, then the 
prices in markets A and B should have approached equality. The level 
of price should have been at the demand and supply intersection. 
Profits of middlemen should have approached zero. The volume in 
both markets should have been 14 units. It would be as if demanders 
and suppliers were in the same market and middlemen did not exist. 
As shown in figure 1, the predictions of the model are approximately 
correct, and there is a time series of all contract prices in the order in 
which they occurred. With time and replication of periods the prices in 
both markets converged to the predicted equilibrium price of $1.67. 
The predicted carryforward of 14 units was close to the actual volume. 
Profits of middlemen dissipated to near zero as predicted. 
From a practical perspective the competitive model works rather 
well when applied to the middleman markets. No model of which I am 
aware, based on principles other than some form of rationality, does as 
well as does the competitive model. Indeed, in this simple example 
there are many chances for things to go wrong. First, notice that the 
theory of derived demand is working twice removed. Derived demand 
theory was used to postulate the market demand of final consumers as 
induced by the experimenter. Derived demand for a factor of produc- 
tion was used by middlemen when they purchased a "resource" from 
the sellers in room A and transformed it into a product for sale in room 
B. Notice that this transformation took place under conditions of ex- 
treme uncertainty. The middlemen did not know the demand function, 
prices, or any other aspect of the market (or market theory). Somehow 
they assessed the consequences of their actions with reasonable accu- 
racy. Once having acquired inventories, the middlemen showed no 
evidence of falling prey to the sunk-cost fallacy. When mistakes ap- 
peared to have been made, that is, when middlemen seem to have 
carried too much forward, the middlemen readily sold at a loss and 
recovered as much as possible. (In the first period, 1 unit was carried 
forward and not sold, but in subsequent periods this problem never 
occurred.) Notice also that we have some confirmation of the "free 
riding" or "prisoner's dilemma" model as applied to public goods. 
Middlemen had a common interest in keeping prices low in market A 
and high in market B. Outbidding a fellow middleman and gaining the 
associated personal profits is the market analogue of free riding. These 
participants were not characterized by such a concern for fellow mid- 
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dlemen that they would forgo advantages of individual gain in order 
that the profits of all might be higher. Not only is there support here for 
a "rational" perspective, but there is support for the additional propo- 
sition that these people in this setting were not naturally concerned 
about others; or, if they were so concerned, it was not apparent in their 
collective actions. 
While the middleman type of market experiment suggests that ele- 
ments of the rational agent model can capture much of the actual 
human behavior, we cannot assume that this is the end of the story. 
Even this simple market exhibits behavior that at best is not predicted 
by the model and at worst is wholly inconsistent with the model. 
Notice first that the model becomes accurate only after a process of 
convergence. The model says nothing about that. Notice that the ad- 
justment process contains events that are hard to reconcile with ration- 
ality. In the A market, prices existed that were substantially below 
those observed in the previous A market, and prices tended to move up 
during a period. Why did sellers simply not wait and capture the higher 
prices? Why in period 7 did the buyer pay $2.31 when such high prices 
had never been necessary before? Notice that in market B of periods 
1-2 an excess demand existed but that prices were below equilibrium. 
The model predicts equilibrium, and in periods 1-2 this did not occur. 
B. Auctions 
Some of the most extensive use of the precision afforded by rationality 
postulates is found in the auction literature. This example is of special 
importance because it is the only example of which I am aware that the 
full implications of rationality axioms have been deduced in opera- 
tional terms in a form that can be examined by an experimenter. Put 
another way, this is the only example in all of economics where a 
reasonably complete theory about rational behavior in markets exists. 
Compare two types of sealed-bid auctions in which a single item is to 
be sold. Each bidder tenders a single bid in private that is collected and 
examined (privately) by the market (auctioneer). The object will be 
awarded to the highest bidder. If the auction is a first-price auction, the 
winning bidder will pay the amount of his own bid. If the auction is a 
second-price auction, the winner will pay the amount of the second- 
highest bid. 
The scientific challenge is to compare the bids tendered in each type 
of market and, more ambitiously, to predict the bids tendered. Suppose 
that N agents are participating and that all participants know that vi, the 
value of the object to each bidder i, is drawn from a probability distri- 
bution with support on the interval [Y, V]. Notice three aspects of the 
challenge. First, the institution can be viewed as a treatment variable, 
so, even if the theory fails to predict individual agent behavior, it still 
might add insight about market behavior. When dealing with econom- 
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ics, the role of the market as an aspect of inquiry should always be kept 
in focus. Second, it is the actions taken by agents and not their 
thoughts, thought processes, feelings, or attitudes that are to be 
studied. Finally, the concepts of value and probability that are fre- 
quently a cause for concern by critics of economics are built into the 
theory at the outset. 
An experimental approach to the problem was first developed by 
Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980) and has since expanded dramat- 
ically. To appreciate the role of rationality in this investigation we will 
consider only a simple case. The values vi are independently drawn 
from a constant density on [0, 1], so, by expressing bids as a fraction of 
the largest possible value, any interval can be considered. Each agent 
knows his own value before bidding but not the value of others. The 
above facts are public knowledge and can be controlled for experimen- 
tal purposes; that is, auctions can actually be created that objectively 
have the requisite properties. 
How might one go about developing a model of the situation? The 
auction theory literature suggests that the system will behave as if the 
following are true. (a) Agents choose in accord with the expected util- 
ity hypothesis. To obtain a model that can be solved we will assume 
each player has a utility function of wealth, Ui(y) = yr, where r is 
distributed across the population by a publicly known probability dis- 
tribution, +, on [0, 1]. The constant r is a risk-aversion factor. This 
assumption will be treated as a maintained hypothesis for purposes of 
analyzing the data and testing the theory. (b) At the time of choice each 
agent, i, knows (vi, r,), his own value and risk parameter, but knows 
only the probability distribution from which those of others were 
drawn. (c) Each individual follows Bayes's law in forming expecta- 
tions. (d) Each individual will choose a Nash equilibrium bidding func- 
tion. (e) There are N agents. 
Under all the above assumptions the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
bidding functions are 
vi, for all i if the second-price auction is used; 
bi (N - 1)vi 
N-i +r' (_ l _ , for all i if the first-price auction is used. 
The comparative institutional prediction is that the expected price 
under the first-price auction is greater than the expected price under 
the second-price auction. Table 1 reproduces the results of some of 
Smith's experiments. The range of the support function [0, V] was 
varied with N to keep expected profits, as calculated by the model, the 
same as N increased. First, notice that the model is very accurate when 
applied to the second-price auction for N > 3. For example, if N = 6, 
the model predicts a mean price of 12. 1, and the actual price averaged 
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11.21. The predicted variances are also close to those observed. As 
predicted by the model, people tend to bid their value when they par- 
ticipate in the second-price auction. Second, notice that the prediction 
about the market treatment variable is also correct. The average price 
for the second-price auctions is below the average price of the first- 
price auctions for every value of N. The first-price auction generates 
more revenue as predicted. 
The risk-neutral model (r = 1) tends to develop inaccuracies when 
applied to the magnitude of first-price auction bids. Of course the risk- 
neutrality parameter was not controlled in these experiments. In any 
case, prices in the first-price auction are higher than those predicted by 
the model if we assume that r = 1. If the data are tested for every value 
of N against the risk-averse model, which predicts that observed prices 
will be above the risk-neutral prediction, the model cannot be rejected 
forN > 3. 
The support for the Nash-equilibrium-based models has continued as 
research has expanded to a study of the multiple units case, although 
the model has encountered difficulties for some values of N. For the 
single-unit case, however, the full Nash equilibrium model with all its 
implicit and explicit rationality assumptions is the most accurate model 
that exists. To the extent that the model places restrictions on data it is 
consistent with the facts in an absolute sense. 
TABLE 1 Theoretical Predictions and Means and Variances 
Pooled over N Markets 
First-Price Auction Second-Price Auction 
Number and Observed Risk Neutral Observed 
Statistics Price Theoretical (r 1) Price Theoretical 
3: * 
Mean 2.44 2.5 1.97 2.5 
Variance .589 .384 .759 .96 
4:t 
Mean 5.64 4.9 ... ... 
Variance 1.80 .96 ... ... 
5:t 
Mean 9.14 8.1 ... ... 
Variance 1.37 1.83 ... ... 
6:t 
Mean 13.22 12.1 11.21 12.1 
Variance 4.31 3.0 8.20 6.4 
9:t 
Mean 31.02 28.9 27.02 28.9 
Variance 4.91 8.38 18.66 18.85 
SOURCE.-COX, Roberson, and Smith (1982). 
* N = 70. 
t N = 60. 
tN = 30. 
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C. Signaling 
The third example is a demonstration that the equilibrium notions 
motivated by concepts of optimizing behavior can capture the essence 
of very complicated and interdependent phenomena. The model itself 
was originally motivated by a cynical view of education (Spence 1974). 
Imagine a world in which education has no intrinsic value but is very 
costly in terms of time and effort to all but the smartest people. By 
paying an appropriate premium for educated employees, employers 
can make education a profitable investment for smart people but not 
for others. Thus the employers can hire just the people they wish 
(smart) by paying a premium for an attribute they do not value (educa- 
tion). Theoretically, the employers can do this even though the intelli- 
gence level of the prospective employee prior to employment can be 
observed by no one other than the employee himself; and, when asked, 
a prospective employee has an incentive to lie. 
The point of the exercise is not to explore the appropriateness of the 
reasoning when applied to investments in education. The purpose is to 
explore the nature of equilibrium when such asymmetric information 
exists in markets. We inquire about the appropriateness of equilibrat- 
ing principles that are asserted to be operative and the ability of mathe- 
matical statements to capture them. 
The example was intended only to help one understand the labora- 
tory market that was created. In the laboratory market several sellers 
have 2 units each of a commodity that can be sold. The units have two 
characteristics: grade, which can be either Regular (R) or Super (S), 
and quality, which initially is zero but can be added by the seller. 
Grade is like a {dumb, smart} variable, and quality is like education that 
can be added at cost. A seller's 2 units are either both R or both S. Half 
the sellers have R's, and the other half have S's, as determined ran- 
domly and secretly before any trading begins. Before purchase, N 
buyers can observe quality added, but the underlying grade is discov- 
ered only after purchase and after the market period is closed. 
Buyers like Supers better than Regulars, and buyers place some 
value on any additional quality added by sellers (i.e., education has 
some value). In particular, for each unit purchased buyers have the 
following value (determined by the experimenter by using the tech- 
niques of induced preference described in the introduction): 
V(g, q) = G(g) + Q(q), 
where 
g E {R, S} {Regular, Super}; 
q E [0, oo) = quality added by seller; 
G(g) = { $2.50 if g = 5, $.50 if g = R; 
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Q = $.205q - $.005q2 if q c 20, Q(q) 
--l $[(.205)(20) - (.005)(202)] + $.Olq if q > 20. 
Sellers face costs of adding quality of $. 15q and $.02q if the units are 
Regulars or Supers, respectively. It costs less to add q (get educated) if 
the unit is a Super (smart). 
The most efficient signaling equilibrium is a fascinating concept 
when considered from a rationality perspective. The equilibrium is 
defined by the following equations: 
all Regulars will be produced at the same quality, qR, 
and will sell at the same price, PR; (1) 
all Supers will be produced at the same quality, qs, 
and will sell at the same price, Ps. 
The two conditions in (1) follow from an underlying axiom requiring 
that no arbitrage exists. If different prices and qualities existed within 
grades, then profit opportunities would exist, and rational agents would 
take advantage of them: 
V(R, qR) = PR; (2) 
V(S, qs) = Ps. 
The equations in (2) pick up two aspects of behavior. First, having 
observed the quality level, qR or qs, the buyer can infer the grade, R or 
S, with certainty. Quality and grade are perfectly correlated. Second, 
once this is known the demand and supply model under certainty be- 
comes applicable. For any unit with characteristics (g, q) a horizontal 
demand exists. Recall that the values of consumers were defined per 
unit, so, without budget constraints and with prices below value and no 
uncertainty, the buyer would want an infinite quantity of all possible 
commodities. The limited supply (vertical supply curve) and horizontal 
demand curve drive prices to the maximum, that is, the demand price: 
PR- . l5qR Ps - . 15qs; (3) 
Ps - .02qs 2 PR - .02qR. 
The two conditions in (3) require that truthful revelation is incentive 
compatible. Regular sellers maximize profits by selling units at the 
quality level recognized by buyers as Regulars. Super sellers maximize 
profits by selling units at quality levels recognized by buyers as Supers: 
max{[V(R, qR) - . l5qR] + [V(S, qS) - .02qs]}. (4) 
Condition (4) captures a type of "market rationality." It says that 
profits of the system will be maximized subject to the behavioral con- 
straints defined in (1)-(3). 
In less opaque terms, the final condition (4) can be interpreted as 
another type of demand and supply condition. The qs and qR will be 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Mar 2014 18:50:56 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
S314 Journal of Business 
adjusted to reflect gains from exchange. The maximization formulation 
captures the idea that this adjustment in the quality levels of the com- 
modity will continue until further adjustments would negate the signal- 
ing value implicit in (1). The idea is explained geometrically in figure 2. 
The value functions for a single buyer are drawn from Regulars and 
Supers. The increases in value with additional quality are as shown. 
Equation (2) says that the price of an S will be along the top curve and 
that the price of an R will be along the bottom curve. The qualities, qR 
and qs, must be such that they are not equal and thereby signal to the 
buyer the underlying grade. The qualities should also be located such 
that sellers of R's have no interest in marketing their units at (Ps, qs), 
and so forth, as demanded by (2). Finally, qR should be located to 
maximize system profits, and qs should be the minimum possible level 
consistent with (2). A check of the equations will demonstrate that 
(qR, qs) = (6, 27), as shown in the figure, have the requisite properties. 
Twelve markets with the above (and related) parameters were re- 
ported in Miller and Plott (1985). The results were mixed in the sense 
that other variations of the model outlined above were more accurate 
than was that particular model. However, the interesting thing from the 
perspective of this paper is that the model captured any of the market 
data at all; yet in two of the 11 markets this complicated model that is 
filled with rationality postulates is very accurate. The data points are 
shown in figure 2 near the predicted equilibrium. The quality of Regu- 
lars, qR, is correct, and the quality of supers, q,s, is a little too high. 
Variances in qualities and prices are very low. Prices are slightly below 
the predicted level, reflecting a frequently observed property of mar- 
kets that agents will not trade for zero reward. Behavior of the type 
described in this model is certainly not beyond human or market capa- 
bilities. 
III. Ex Post Rationalization (Reparameterization) 
When markets perform in unusual or unexpected ways, the rationality 
postulates suggest hypotheses to explain why. The econometrics and 
field studies literature are filled with ex post rationalization techniques, 
but very little has been said about them in laboratory economics pa- 
pers. 
The idea of reparameterization is important in a second way. Ration- 
ality at a market level of analysis can be separated from rationality at 
the individual level. Suppose that the market model works well given 
the individual agent's personal decision rules. So, from observed mar- 
ket behavior we can make some reasonable inferences about what 
actual individual decision rules must have been. Suppose further that 
from induced preference theory we obtain an independent theoretical 
idea about what a rational individual's decision rule would have been in 
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the experiment. By comparing the inferred actual with the theoretical 
rational we can perhaps develop a methodology for testing the latter as 
they are relevant for economics. 
To demonstrate how rationality principles can be used in this capac- 
ity, the data from four experiments are analyzed. These are experi- 
ments that would have been discarded because of (allegedly) poor 
experimental control. These experiments were done in the mid-1960s 
and early 1970s before some of the experimental techniques currently 
used had been developed. They are all oral auction markets that dif- 
fered in various ways from the oral double auction now in use. Each 
trader had 2 units and could tender an all-or-none offer. Offers remain 
open until canceled or taken. The instructions were not administered 
carefully. No tests on procedures or practice rounds were allowed. The 
accounting was not checked for confused or cheating participants, and 
so on. In essence the current operational procedures for making certain 
that subjects understand the reward medium and the market technol- 
ogy were not followed-or so we would like to believe. 
The nature of the markets was to induce simple demand and supply 
functions different from those that had previously been examined. Also 
present were multiple units, which, at the time of the experiments, had 
not been studied. The question posed was whether the observed prices 
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FIG. 2.-Model parameters and predictions displayed with actual experi- 
mental outcomes. 
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The answer was a rather resounding "no." The initial parameters 
are shown as the solid-line demand and supply functions in figures 3-4. 
For the most part the data are well removed from the predictions of the 
model. 
Whenever data are trashed, a danger exists that the problem is the 
principles that guided the models, not the lack of parametric control. 
However, when examining subjects' decisions, many seemed to vio- 
late the intuitive notions of rationality stemming from confusion or a 
willingness to violate the rules of the market. 
An exercise was undertaken to "reparameterize" the experiments. 
We wished to provide a method of adjusting individual preference 
parameters in light of their choices and determine the extent to which 
the revised market model fits the data. The rules used were as follows. 
(a) If a buyer (seller) buys (sells) a unit for more (less) than the redemp- 
tion value (cost) of the unit, then the limit price is adjusted to the 
transaction price. (b) If an agent never bid or traded during the entire 
experiment and passed up profitable opportunities (suitably defined), 
then the parameters are adjusted as if the agent were not present. (c) If 
an agent failed to trade for 2 consecutive periods and passed up 
profitable opportunities (suitably defined), then the limit prices are 
revised to equal the highest (lowest) bid to buy (offer to sell) that the 
agent tendered or accepted for that unit in any period throughout the 
experiment. (d) If an agent transacts for more units than the maximum 
permitted, then the units are adjusted to the maximum number of such 
extra units traded in any period, and the limit prices are the highest 
(lowest) price paid (received) for those units during the entire ex- 
periment. 
The revised demand and supplies are the dotted curves in figures 3- 
4. The price predictions of the revised model fit much better than they 
do in the original in three of the four cases, and in the fourth case the 
price predictions are identical. The volume figures are worse after 
reparameterization because in all cases the actual volume was low 
relative to the original model and because the revised parameters pre- 
dicted even lower volume. 
The exercise demonstrates two properties of rationality-based theo- 
ries. First, the adjustment of parameters need not induce circularity in 
the reasoning. Ex post theories based on rationality can certainly be 
rejected. For example, the observed volume can be used to reject the 
revised model. Second, in view of subsequent experimentation, the 
decision to discard the data was probably correct. If these subjects are 
"equivalent" to those used in subsequent experiments, and if the mar- 
ket organization had no special effects, then the actual preferences 
used by the subjects were not those the experimenter attempted to 
induce. If preferences are stable, we know now that under the double 
oral auction prices converge to the competitive equilibrium. Thus sub- 
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sequent experiments tell us that the markets in the figures above had 
adjusted to the actual preferences. Even if participants are confused 
and "irrational" from certain perspectives, the market model can still 
be applied. 
The only other attempt to revise parameters of a market model based 
on decisions made during the experiment is the ongoing work by Knez, 
Smith, and Williams (1985). They have attempted to measure individ- 
ual attitudes during a market, and to use those parameters for predic- 
tion they tested a market model based on measured parameters against 
the model with parameters as specified a priori by the experimenter. 
The markets themselves are for lotteries in which subjects stated their 
limit prices-maximum (minimum) willingness to pay (sell)-prior to 
the opening of each market period. Their conclusions are (a) that the 
act of measurement does not appear to affect the market; (b) that the 
market model drawn from the measured parameters is more accurate 
than is the model constructed from induced preferences; and (c) that 
many subjects (in the 40% range) exhibited a willingness to violate their 
own stated limit prices. Knez et al. suggest that the elicited parameters 
are analogous to guesses about how subjects will trade or, perhaps, are 
similar to wishes as opposed to true limit prices. Nevertheless, the 
measured parameters improve predictions about market prices. 
IV. New Institutions 
The rationality postulates have been useful in suggesting new institu- 
tional arrangements that have never before existed. The research on 
public goods provision mechanisms is a good example. Other examples 
include the work by Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1981) on the allocation 
of landing rights by auction or the work by Rassanti, Smith, and Bulfin 
(1982) on a combinatorial auction to solve the same problem. Experi- 
mental methods have been the only source of data about how these 
new institutions might perform. 
An interesting example, with possibly limited social usefulness, is 
the unstable dollar auction.4 The idea is to create processes that appli- 
cations of rationality theory suggest will have bizarre properties. In 
this case the objective is to attempt to sell a dollar to perfectly informed 
people for much more than a dollar. Intuitively, it seems that rational 
consumers would never do such a thing, but intuition is not always a 
reliable scientific tool. 
Subjects, after having attended an economics experiment, are fre- 
4. This auction process first appears in print in Shubik (1971). In conversation Shubik 
tells me that he hesitates to take full credit for having invented the process because many 
unusual processes were proposed in conversation among game theorists at Princeton in 
the early 1950s. The theorists were using game theory to invent processes in which 
rational behavior by individuals would lead to surprising behavior. 
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quently in a room calculating their earnings. Having calculated their 
earnings and having not yet been paid, a dollar auction is announced. 
Subjects are carefully told that an English auction will be used. The 
market will stop if 45 seconds elapse after a bid with no intervening bid. 
The dollar will be given to the highest bidder, but the second-highest 
bidder must pay the amount of his own bid; that is, high bidder gets the 
dollar, but the second-highest bidder pays for it. Bids cannot exceed 
the amount earned in the previous experiment, and no talking is al- 
lowed. 
The game is not well understood from a game-theoretic perspective. 
The version with unlimited budgets and unlimited time has no solution 
except infinite bids. With limitations on endowments, under no circum- 
stances can nonparticipation by everyone be a Nash equilibrium. Mod- 
els of the situation exist in which a solution involves participation from 
everyone and in which everyone should be prepared to bid their en- 
dowment.5 The point is that models based on concepts of rationality 
suggest that rational people might produce intuitively impossible, or 
perhaps irrational, results (i.e., selling a dollar for much more than a 
dollar). 
The data from five such auctions are in figure 5. The dots are the 
actual bids in dollars as they occurred in sequence. As can be seen, the 
dollar always sold for much more than a dollar. In auction 1, for ex- 
ample, the dollar went to a bid of $27, and the price actually paid by the 
second-highest bidder was $20. Some of the relevant data are in table 2. 
Participants are indexed according to the size of their budget, with the 
person with the largest budget called person number 1. In auction 1 the 
5. A complete game-theoretic treatment of the auction is not available. Kim Border 
and Joel Sobel (private correspondence) have produced the following model. The insight 
of the model is to treat the auction like a sealed-bid auction. The sealed bid is interpreted 
as a reservation price above which the subject will not go during the actual English 
auction bidding process. Consider only the two-person case for exposition purposes with 
the following rules: (i) high bidder receives $1.00 and pays nothing; (ii) second-highest 
bidder receives zero and pays his bid; (iii) bids must be nonnegative and no more than 
wealth; and (iv) common knowledge is that wealth is independently and identically 
distributed from cumulative density function F(-), is supported on [0, A], and has con- 
tinuous densityf(-). Let V(x) = (1 + x)F(x) - x; M(W) = max{x c W: x max's V on [0, 
W]}; and b(W) = W - {V[M(W)] - V(W)}/[- F(W)], using the convention that, if 
F(W) = 1, then {V[M(W)] - V(W)}/[1 - F(W)] = 0. The bidding function, b(W), is the 
equilibrium strategy of a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium with risk-neutral players. 
Generalization to N bidders is straightforward. As an example consider the two-person 
case in which F(-) is uniform over [0, A]. The optimum bidding function is 
'W, if W2>-A- 1; 
b(W) AWw if W<A-1. 
In this case the equilibrium strategy is to be prepared to bid all your wealth if your wealth 
is one less than the maximum possible wealth. Border has also produced an example in 
which the optimal strategy is for all bidders to always bid all their wealth. 
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person with the largest endowment had $40. The auction winner had 
the sixth-largest endowment at $27.54. The person who paid $20 had an 
endowment of $20.70. These were the only two bidders after the four- 
teenth bid of $8.00. Frequently, the auction stopped only after a bidder 
hit a constraint. The individual who acquired the dollar tended to have 
an above-average endowment. On the average, people lost a great deal 
of money. 
The phenomenon suggested by the models actually exists. The data 
contain three interesting lessons. First, models of rational choice help 
us look beyond the market organizations that have evolved through 
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FIG. 5.-Bid time series from five dollar auctions (see table 2) 
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history to find institutions that might be capable of performing some 
specific task. One might imagine nobler tasks than to sell a dollar for 
more than a dollar, but that is not the issue. Second, the existence of 
intuitively "irrational" market behavior is not conclusive evidence 
that models based on concepts of individual rationality are inappropri- 
ate or ill-equipped to be useful in applications. Finally, the example 
demonstrates that models based on optimization principles are filled 
with subtleties often unappreciated by critics of rationality. As far as I 
am aware, the game described above has never been solved with any 
degree of generality. We do not know some of the major properties of 
the Nash equilibrium strategies should they exist. Given the current 
development of theory, the data cannot be used either to confirm or to 
reject a theory. 
V. Pending Problems 
The review above contains no examples of the failure of an economic 
model to confront the data successfully. I do not want to leave the 
reader with the impression that such examples do not exist. This sec- 
tion is intended to disabuse anyone of the notion that our models are in 
perfect shape and that the rationality foundation needs neither exami- 
nation nor modification. Many problems and paradoxes exist. This 
paper was not organized around the failure of the models because the 
reasons for the failures are not clear. Arguments like those in Section 
III that show differences of procedures and incentives as explanations 
for unexpected market behavior are very much in contention with 
arguments that would change entirely the way we think about econom- 
ics. 
The potential problems with rational choice models that have been 
identified by psychologists and that might be manifest in market behav- 
ior have not been systematically explored. This lack of study reflects a 
resource constraint and not a lack of interest or enthusiasm. Two ex- 
ceptions to the general rule exist currently, and I understand that more 
attempts to study markets for evidence of "heuristics" are under way. 
In an experimental study by Plott and Wilde (1982) the "representa- 
tiveness" heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) was given an oppor- 
tunity to work. Subjects had valuations for commodity units that were 
contingent on an underlying state of nature. Prior probabilities were 
generated by a bingo cage. Once a state of nature was chosen (one for 
each buyer), a clue to the state was generated by a draw from a second 
bingo cage. The distribution governing the draws from the second cage 
was contingent on the state determined by the first draw. After receiv- 
ing their personal clue, buyers would participate in a market in which 
the units were being sold. After this process was repeated for several 
periods (during which the market equilibrated in the usual fashion), the 
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market supply was shifted. The representativeness heuristic predicted 
no change in volume due to the lowered price. In reality, slight in- 
creases occurred as would be anticipated from risk-averse expected 
utility behavior with Bayesian agents. 
A more direct examination of the base-rate fallacy has been con- 
ducted by Duh and Sunder (1985). The experiment was similar to the 
Plott and Wilde experiment, but the supply was completed inelastic, 
thereby letting price serve as a measure of valuation, and the markets 
were organized differently. The experiments also varied the base rate 
to see if the markets responded appropriately. A model based on the 
principle that base rates would be ignored was rejected in favor of a 
model based on the principle that people would follow Bayes's law. 
The present lack of support in experimental markets for the psychol- 
ogy-based ideas is not going to be the end of the story. Many properties 
of markets have been observed that are not explicable in terms of 
current models. Posted prices have an independent effect on market 
prices (Plott and Smith 1978); nonbinding price ceilings affect market 
convergence (Isaac and Plott 1981; Smith and Williams 1981); and 
bubbles can be observed in asset markets (Plott and Sunder 1983; 
Camerer 1984; Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1986). The dynamics of 
the convergence process in equilibrating markets is not theoretically 
understood at all (Davis and Williams, in press). In fact we have only 
begun to develop a theory based on individual strategic decisions about 
why equilibrium is attained in any experimental markets where equilib- 
rium has been observed (Wilson 1982; Friedman 1984; Easley and 
Ledyard 1986). The Dutch auction behaves differently from the first- 
price auction even though they are supposed to be behaviorally 
isomorphic (Coppinger et al. 1980). The signaling experiments dis- 
cussed above contain events that suggest that some of the markets 
studied failed to incorporate information that was clearly present in a 
statistical sense. The markets appeared to adjust appropriately only 
after a change in experimental procedure drew attention to the statisti- 
cal regularity. The questions that now exist about the need for econo- 
mists to consider the decision process used by individuals in addition 
to observed choices are likely to occur with increasing frequency. 
The role of morality, altruism, and ethical predispositions in forming 
choice is another area of potential discoveries. Needless to say, there 
has been no way of separating theories of altruistically based behavior 
and moralistic behavior from preference theory or rational choice theo- 
ries. Furthermore, since preference theory requires no theory about 
the source of preferences, no overriding need for a separate theory of 
moral behavior has been solidly demonstrated. The fact that prefer- 
ences might include or reflect moral considerations does not, on the 
surface, contradict a theory of rational choice or maximizing behavior. 
Moral considerations might influence the shape and form of prefer- 
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ences, but that does not contradict the existence of preferences or 
choices based on them. One can argue that the existence of morally 
based behavior provides evidence of rational choice. Experimental 
markets with externalities, public goods decision processes, and re- 
lated commons dilemma experiments have not shown the domination 
of moral considerations over financial motivation (Dawes 1980). Thus 
no review of procedures and theories has been forced on experimental- 
ists. Nevertheless, evidence of morally based decisions does exist (Pal- 
frey and Rosenthal 1985). In committee experiments the evidence is 
pronounced especially when as few as three participants are involved 
(Isaac and Plott 1978; Eavey and Miller 1984). Furthermore, a 
methodology for investigating experimentally the phenomena and re- 
lated theories of moral choices is being explored. Hoffman and Spitzer 
(1985) formulate a strong case that it is possible to formulate in opera- 
tional terms competing theories about moral attitudes and that it is 
possible to use experimental techniques to assess their relative accu- 
racy. How our models of rational choice become modified to include 
the technical features of moral attitudes (consistent? myopic? stable? 
sensitivity and responsiveness of choice to evidence?), if such exist, 
remains an open question. 
VI. Closing Remarks 
The tone of this paper is defensive. Claims about the irrelevance of 
models of rational choice and the consequent irrelevance of economics 
are not uncommon topics of conversation. Even economists some- 
times engage in disparaging remarks about the discipline because of 
doubts about either the testability or the validity of the optimization 
hypothesis. If one looks at experimental markets for evidence, the 
pessimism is not justified. Market models based on rational choice 
principles (including the subspecies of satisficing) do a pretty good job 
of capturing the essence of very complicated phenomena. 
On the other hand, the evidence presented here should provide no 
one with a feeling of overconfidence. Referees who summarize experi- 
mental papers by saying, The results are obvious because they follow 
immediately from rational choice, have not looked very closely at the 
theory and the data. While the theory of rational choice provides a very 
useful set of general principles, it is a mistake to elevate the theory to 
the status of irrefutable law that always reliably operates and need not 
be challenged. 
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